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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 16-3776 
__________ 
 
JAMIE MCKNIGHT, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
AIMBRIDGE EMPLOYEE SERVICE CORPORATION 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court Civil No. 2-15-cv-03461) 
District Judge:  Honorable John R. Padova 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 July 13, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, NYGAARD, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 26, 2017) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Jamie McKnight appeals the order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment to defendant Aimbridge Employee Service Corporation, dismissing his Section 
1981 and Title VII claims of race discrimination and retaliation.  We conclude that the 
appeal is wholly without merit and will affirm. 
 McKnight asserts that Aimbridge Employee Service Corporation, which manages 
the Hilton Garden Inn at which he was employed, discriminated against him on the basis 
of race.1  McKnight identifies as African-American.  He argues generally that the District 
Court applied wrong standards to its review of his claims of racial discrimination and 
retaliation.  He says it was not lenient enough.  He also contends that the District Court 
ignored or misunderstood evidence that supports his claims.2  None of these arguments 
are persuasive. 
 We conclude that the District Court properly understood that the three-week 
training provided by Aimbridge was a prerequisite for anyone who wanted to work in the 
banquet position at the hotel.  No one disputes that McKnight completed only one day of 
this training.  Therefore, the District Court did not misapprehend the nature of the 
training, nor did it apply an inappropriate standard to analyze the qualifications element 
                                              
1 Magna Hospitality Group hired McKnight to work at the Hilton Garden Inn in June 
2013 but Aimbridge took over management of the hotel in October 2013. 
2 McKnight must prove that “(1) [he] is a member of a protected class, (2) [he] was 
qualified for the position [he] sought to attain or retain, (3) [he] suffered an adverse 
employment action, and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could give rise 
to an inference of intentional discrimination.”  Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 
F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 
2008)).   
3 
 
of his case.  It properly determined that McKnight’s failure to complete this mandated 
training is evidence that he was not qualified for the banquet position.3 
 McKnight alternately argues the District Court ignored that he was refused any 
opportunity to train in spite of him “continually” attempting to be scheduled for training.  
Yet, he admits there were communications with him and Aimbridge supervisors in June, 
July and December 20144 in which Aimbridge supervisors either attempted to schedule 
McKnight for training or asked him why he was not completing the training.5  He also 
admits he made no effort to contact Aimbridge supervisors between August and 
sometime in December 2014.  McKnight urges us to ignore all of this and instead focus 
on his testimony that he made numerous calls to Aimbridge supervisors in June, July and 
August of 2014.  This, he says, creates a factual dispute about whether Aimbridge refused 
his efforts to get training, preventing summary judgment on the qualifications prong.  But 
he admitted that, with one exception in August, he did not leave messages when 
Aimbridge supervisors did not answer his phone calls.  Therefore, even with every 
                                              
3 After McKnight did not report for training on June 28, 2014, he worked one full day of 
training on June 29, 2014.  Jones does not contest that he did not attend training on June 
28, but claims that Aimbridge was aware that he could be at the hotel on that day and 
would attend on June 29.  This dispute about whether he was scheduled for training on 
June 28, and whether he missed it, is not material to our analysis. 
4 McKnight disputes Aimbridge’s claim that its supervisors made other calls to 
McKnight.  For summary judgment purposes, we will accept McKnight’s assertion as 
true. 
5 He asserts that an Aimbridge supervisor, Erica Kim, made employment in the banquet 
position contingent on him signing a document that prevented him from working in any 
other position in the hotel.  He says he refused to sign.  But McKnight fails to show that 
this act was discriminatory, and he negates the allegation altogether by stating that the 
general manager soon after told him that signing this document was not necessary to 
work in the banquet position. 
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reasonable inference construed in McKnight’s favor, we are not persuaded that a factual 
dispute exists.  His admissions contradict his contention that Aimbridge refused him any 
opportunity to train or work.6  Moreover, one unreturned phone call over a period of six 
months does not reasonably ground McKnight’s claim that Aimbridge actively thwarted 
his own efforts to get the training that he needed. 
 Next, we reject his claim that defendant’s offer of the banquet position is in itself 
evidence that he was and is qualified for the job.  So, too, do we dismiss his claim that 
establishing qualification for the position at the prima facie stage is solely focused on 
whether he is able-bodied.  The undisputed record makes clear that the hotel required 
every person to train for three weeks before they were deemed qualified to work in a 
banquet position.  No more need be said.  
  Finally, McKnight contends that the District Court ignored the second basis for 
his assertion of race discrimination.7  McKnight claims that, after Aimbridge granted his 
request to transfer from a kitchen job to a banquet job, it discriminated against him by 
refusing to schedule him to work.  He complains that Aimbridge never mentioned this 
second discrimination claim at summary judgment, and that the District Court failed to 
analyze it.  As a result, McKnight says the claim survived summary judgment.  There are 
two problems with this argument. 
                                              
6 McKnight’s briefs gloss over the requirement to receive mandated training before he 
could work in the banquet position. 
7 McKnight asserts this was a termination from the line cook position.  The undisputed 
record indicates that McKnight requested the transfer from line cook to the banquet 
position. 
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 First, Aimbridge addressed this very claim in its motion for summary judgment.  It 
argued that McKnight failed to allege a prima facie claim of discrimination because he 
did not show that animus motivated the Aimbridge supervisor (Tammy Kim) to not 
schedule him for work after he transferred from the kitchen to the banquet position.8  Yet, 
McKnight’s response to Aimbridge’s motion against his discrimination claims focused 
solely on the qualification prong of his claim (whether he was qualified for the banquet 
job).  He addressed the failure-to-schedule aspect of Aimbridge’s motion only in his 
discussion of the retaliation claim.  Therefore, McKnight never rebutted Aimbridge’s 
claim that he failed to show a prima facie claim of discrimination based on his post-
transfer work schedule. 
 Second, as McKnight acknowledges in briefing, the District Court dismissed 
McKnight’s discrimination case entirely.9  Moreover, addressing McKnight’s retaliation 
argument at summary judgment, the District Court explicitly dismissed the post-transfer 
kitchen work schedule aspect of his suit in the context of his retaliation claims.  
Therefore, McKnight’s arguments that the scheduling issue was never raised by 
Aimbridge and never decided by the District Court are not supported by the record. 
                                              
8 McKnight construes this issue on appeal as focusing on Aimbridge’s refusal to schedule 
him to work in the kitchen after he was transferred from there.  McKnight never asserted 
this claim at summary judgment.  Rather, the claim was construed more generally as 
Aimbridge’s failure to schedule him for work after it granted his transfer from the kitchen 
to the banquet position. 
9 Since, before the District Court, McKnight did not dispute Aimbridge’s assertion that he 
failed to proffer evidence of animus to support a racial discrimination claim arising from 
the kitchen scheduling issue, the rationale for dismissal of this aspect of his claim is self-
evident. 
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 Next we focus on McKnight’s claims of retaliation.  The controversy centers upon 
the causation prong of the retaliation claim.10  McKnight contends that Aimbridge 
retaliated against him for complaining to the general manager of the hotel about racial 
discrimination and for filing a discrimination claim with the EEOC.  They retaliated, he 
says, by holding an evaluation meeting and giving him a written warning for being late to 
work, by setting up a development plan for him to follow, by sending him home early 
after the evaluation meeting, and by refusing to schedule him in the kitchen after this 
meeting. 
 McKnight complains first that the District Court used an improper standard to 
reach its judgment.  The District Court ruled that, without specific evidence of 
discrimination, adverse employment actions (the second prong of the analysis) cannot 
include negative evaluations or written development plans.  The District Court also ruled 
that being sent home early was not an adverse action because he was paid for that full 
day.  It said that the lack of economic harm, or any alteration of the terms and conditions 
of his employment, precludes defining this as an adverse action.  McKnight asserts the 
proper standard is whether such actions could dissuade a reasonable person from 
complaining about his or her treatment. 
                                              
10 “To maintain a claim for retaliation” brought pursuant to § 1981 and Title VII, the 
plaintiff is “first . . . required to establish that he [has] a prima facie case by tendering 
evidence that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) his employer took an adverse 
employment action against him, and (3) there was a causal connection between his 
participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”  Estate of 
Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 798 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Moore v. 
City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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 Nonetheless, there were other actions that Ambridge did not dispute were adverse 
(McKnights’s removal from the kitchen schedule after June 12, 2014, an Aimbridge 
supervisor’s failure to schedule him for hours in the banquet position, and Aimbridge’s 
termination of his employment).  In these instances Aimbridge asserted non-retaliatory 
reasons for taking each action.  In light of this the District Court proceeded, in the context 
of the McDonnell Douglas framework,11 to assess whether McKnight showed that 
Aimbridge’s reasons for these other actions were merely pretextual.  After reviewing 
these claims, we have concluded that the District Court’s pretext analysis is applicable to 
and dispositive of all the adverse actions McKnight asserts.  Therefore, we now turn to 
McKnight’s arguments regarding pretext. 
 McKnight complains that the District Court wrongly used the but-for standard to 
evaluate pretext in the retaliation arguments.  However, our jurisprudence states the 
following. 
‘[T]he plaintiff must be able to convince the factfinder both 
that the employer's proffered explanation was false, and that 
retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment 
action.’  Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500–01 
(3d Cir. 1997).  To survive a motion for summary judgment 
in the employer's favor, a plaintiff must produce some 
evidence from which a jury could reasonably reach these 
conclusions.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
Moore, 461 F.3d at 342.  Therefore, at summary judgment, a non-moving plaintiff must 
create a material dispute of fact about the non-discriminatory reasons the employer 
proffered for its action so that “a reasonable factfinder could rationally find [those 
                                              
11 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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reasons] ‘unworthy of credence’” and, consequently, infer that they were not the basis for 
the employer’s action.  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (quoting Ezold v. Wolf. Block, Schorr and 
Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (1992)).  
 We conclude the District Court properly ruled that the undisputed record fails to 
establish any reasonable basis to even infer that the Aimbridge supervisors who allegedly 
carried out the adverse acts (Erica Maher and Tammy Kim) were aware (at the time 
relevant to these claims) that McKnight complained of race discrimination to the general 
manager of the hotel.12  Likewise, there is no evidence that, at the time of the actions he 
asserts, these supervisors had any knowledge of the EEOC discrimination complaint he 
filed on June 10, 2014.  This conclusion undermines all of McKnight’s bases for claiming 
that the entire collection of adverse actions he presents were discriminatory.  Therefore, 
even if the District Court erred by applying an incorrect standard to assess some of these 
actions at an earlier stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, such error is harmless. 
 McKnight also maintains that evidence of the supervisors’ awareness of his 
discrimination complaints is not needed at this stage of review and that he need only 
provide evidence that a retaliatory motive was more likely than not.  But as we noted 
above, he is required at this stage to provide evidence showing that there is a material 
dispute of fact.  In our view, the District Court determined that McKnight did not meet 
                                              
12 McKnight presses his point by highlighting that the supervisor in question (Erica 
Maher) displayed anger towards McKnight, had socialized with the general manager, and 
knew of McKnight’s request to transfer to the banquet position, something he claims he 
only told the general manager.  The District Court rightly characterized these claims as 
grounding only speculation about the supervisor’s knowledge of his racial discrimination 
claims, not the reasonable inference that is required at summary judgment. 
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his burden to show that Aimbridge’s proffered reason for termination, job abandonment, 
was pretexual.13 Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err. 
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court that granted 
summary judgment in favor of Aimbridge, dismissing McKnight’s claims of racial 
discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII and Section 1981. 
                                              
13 McKnight asserts only that the general manager was aware of his complaint of racial 
discrimination and the EEOC complaints when, six months later, he terminated 
McKnight.  However, in light of the undisputed record of McKnight’s conduct, or lack 
thereof, in the months between his remarks, the complaint, and his termination, this is 
wholly insufficient to meet his burden to establish pretext.   
